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Abstract: We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do 
not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, 
reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that 
include additional economic, historical, and geographic controls. 
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 1. Introduction 
Are new states more corrupt? Newly independent states may lack the monitoring and 
governance mechanisms to control corruption. Furthermore, the transition to independent 
statehood is often fraught with political and economic instability, which may bring forth 
opportunities for corruption. Indeed, previous research finds that being a relatively new state 
has a deleterious impact on the perception of corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2010). On the other 
hand, many independence and separatist movements have been motivated, in part, by the desire 
to stamp out corruption. Some may succeed in replacing corrupt regimes with less corrupt ones. 
 
In this article, we analyze the association between corruption and state age across two measures 
of corruption, one based on expert opinions and the other based firms’ experience of bribery. 
In line with Goel and Nelson (2010), we find that being a relatively new state is associated with 
corruption perceptions. However, we find that the age of the state is not associated with firms’ 
experience of bribery. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include 
additional economic, historical, and geographic controls. The fact that perceptions do not match 
experiences suggests that relatively new states may suffer an unearned reputational cost. It is 
plausible that experts penalize new states because of their relatively shorter history of 
governance and accountability. Experts depend on information to make judgements. The 
informational gap between older and newer states may create more uncertainty among experts, 
which may translate into more severe evaluations. In addition, experts may sometimes conflate 
the informational gap with a lack of transparency, again resulting in more severe evaluations. 
 
Our argument is motivated, in part, by recent work which points to the limitations of corruption 
indicators that are based on experts’ perceptions. The possibility of perception biases in 
commonly used metrics of corruption have been raised by Svensson (2003), Reinikka and 
Svensson (2006), Treisman (2007), and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009). Furthermore, Knack 
(2007) and Kenny (2009) argue that reality may only feed into perceptions indicators with a 
lag. Finally, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) find that surveys of individuals’ experiences 
of corruption are not consistent with experts’ evaluations for Sub-Saharan Africa. They 
conclude that this is due to the ideological and cultural biases in the expert evaluations of 
corruption. 
 
2. Data and variables 
We use two indicators of corruption. The first is the Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around 
the world (Transparency International, 2016). The indicator is based on expert surveys and 
takes values from 1 to 10. We use data from 2012 to 2016 as previous CPI values were 
computed using a different methodology. The second corruption indicator comes from the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and is based on a survey question designed to capture a firm’s 
total annual informal payment or gifts to public officials. Therefore, it captures bribery 
incidence - the percentage of firms that report having had to pay a bribe across a range on 
interactions with the state. These data cover 121 countries from 2002 to 2016. 
 
We measure the age of the state using an indicator that records the time period when a country 
became an independent entity. Previous research has used binary variables which take values 
of 1 if a country became independent after 1950, and 1 if a country became independent before 
1900 (Goel and Nelson, 2010). Our measure of state age improves upon these variables. It 
follows Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), who have developed an indicator which takes a 
value of 0 if independent before 1914, 1 if between 1914 and 1945, 2 if between 1946 and 
1989, and 3 if after 1990. These categories are based on different periods in world politics, 
characterized by shifts in the balance of power in the international system. We updated these 
data for states formed after 1996.  
 
We follow closely the specifications and approach commonly used in studies that seek to 
explain corruption at the country level; in particular, the models of Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 
(2001). To control for the economy we use per capita GDP and to account for broad 
institutional features we use the level of democracy from the Polity IV dataset. To control for 
broad historical factors we use dummy variables that capture the legal history of the state, 
including whether there is a British, French, German, Scandinavian, or socialist legal history. 
The economic data is from the World Development Indicators and the legal history dummies 
are from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003). We also include a battery of regional 
dummies in our analysis to account for other broad cultural, geographic, and historical factors. 
 
3. Corruption and state age: expert opinion vs. outcomes 
Table 1 presents our main results. Columns 1-4 present findings related to expert perceptions 
of corruption. The first column is our base specification, which includes estimates of our 
measure of state age and our economic and democracy control variables. The second column 
adds regional dummy variables. The third column adds legal origin dummy variables to our 
base specification and the fourth column includes all of our economic, institutional, historical, 
and geographic controls. Columns 5-8 repeat these specifications using bribery as our outcome 
of interest.  
 
The age of the state is associated with an increase in corruption perceptions across all age 
categories in the full model in column 4. By contrast, the association between bribery and state 
age is less convincing. There is an association between these variables in our base specification 
in column 5 and our specification with regional dummies in column 6. When one controls for 
legal origin, however, this association does not hold. 
 
GDP per capita is positive and associated with a lower incidence of corruption across all of our 
specifications. A socialist history is bad for both perceptions and reality, across all 
specifications. This is interesting in the context of our study as a socialist legal origin suggests 
a state of a particular vintage. It is not the age of the state that seems to matter for bribe 
incidence but the type of state it began as. By contrast, the level of democracy is associated 
with improved corruption perceptions but not the level of bribery.  
 
The regional dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is statistically significant across all of the 
specifications where it is included. Surprisingly, the direction of the coefficient suggests that 
corruption is a smaller problem in this region in comparison to other regions. However, this is 
only when one controls for GDP per capita. When this GDP per capita is dropped from the 
specification the direction of the coefficient changes. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In line with previous research we find that relatively new states suffer from a reputational cost 
in terms of corruption perceptions. However, we find that these states do not experience more 
corruption on the ground. Firms in relatively new states are no more likely to report corruption 
than those in older states. Substantively, studies have found that perception-based indicators of 
corruption negatively affect foreign investment (Wei, 2000) but experience-based measures of 
corruption do not (Gillanders and Parviainen, 2017). Like many secretive activities, corruption 
is difficult to measure. Our findings and their implications underline the value and importance 
of using alternative measures of corruption. 
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Table 1. Corruption perceptions vs. bribes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions Perceptions Bribe Bribe Bribe Bribe 
         
Age = 1 (1914-1945) -3.57* -7.39*** -4.50*** -7.86*** 5.60** 9.43*** 3.58 6.00 
 (1.858) (1.938) (1.575) (1.682) (2.590) (3.310) (3.717) (3.660) 
Age = 2 (1946-1989) 2.45* -3.68*** 0.93 -3.77*** 2.88 11.50*** 3.64 8.74* 
 (1.410) (1.230) (1.352) (1.270) (2.797) (4.403) (3.238) (4.649) 
Age = 3 (1990-2016) -5.91*** -5.98*** -1.80 -4.98** 3.81 5.31 -2.29 1.78 
 (1.412) (1.906) (1.650) (2.021) (2.417) (3.906) (3.821) (4.172) 
Per capita GDP (log) 9.79*** 9.75*** 8.74*** 9.39*** -6.37*** -8.83*** -6.78*** -7.99*** 
 (0.380) (0.523) (0.386) (0.541) (1.181) (1.246) (1.248) (1.397) 
Democracy scale 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.47*** 0.54*** -0.32 -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 
 (0.075) (0.085) (0.082) (0.091) (0.210) (0.212) (0.229) (0.238) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  5.31**  4.68**  -15.94***  -9.71** 
  (2.206)  (2.214)  (4.596)  (4.605) 
Transition Economy. dummy  -4.07*  0.24  -0.39  -4.35 
  (2.311)  (3.003)  (3.607)  (5.414) 
Western Europe dummy  2.83  -0.70  11.38***  9.75** 
  (2.189)  (2.159)  (2.796)  (3.786) 
Latin America dummy  -12.61***  -10.57***      
  (2.014)  (1.923)     
Asia dummy  1.51  1.09  -5.92  -3.17 
  (1.946)  (2.020)  (4.115)  (4.154) 
French legal origin   -5.04*** -2.90***   0.21 -0.38 
   (1.222) (1.115)   (3.011) (3.249) 
Socialist legal origin   -5.24*** -4.55**   11.00*** 9.77* 
   (1.337) (2.181)   (3.771) (5.497) 
German legal origin   9.14*** 6.18***     
   (1.612) (1.776)     
Scandinavian legal origin   18.83*** 16.22***   8.31**  
   (1.895) (2.311)   (3.800)  
Constant -42.83*** -38.89*** -29.88*** -33.55*** 68.63*** 89.97*** 69.73*** 81.09*** 
 (3.727) (5.275) (3.942) (5.598) (10.270) (10.891) (11.607) (13.681) 
         
Observations 563 563 520 520 216 216 189 189 
R-squared 0.656 0.729 0.721 0.762 0.267 0.341 0.297 0.324 
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